Published: January 14, 2026
Subject: Nick Train (Lindsell Train Limited)
Focus: Finsbury Growth & Income Trust (FGT) & Lindsell Train Investment Trust (LTIT)
Key Numbers: AUM peaked at £24.6bn (June 2021) → fell to £8.3bn (December 2025) = £16.3bn decline
Nick Train, co-founder of Lindsell Train, executed one of the UK’s most distinct “quality-growth” strategies. From 2001 to 2020, this strategy delivered exceptional returns. Since 2021, it has faced a brutal regime change.
In his own words (Feb 2024): “The underperformance is mortifying for me and my colleagues.”
In his own words (Jan 2025): “I sort of feel I’m running out of ways to say sorry.”
In his own words (May 2024): “Those invested in the trust are rightly frustrated after three years of losses. I can absolutely share shareholders’ growing impatience.”
Part I: The Exact Portfolio Structure (December 2025)
Top 10 Holdings ≈ 86.7% of Total NAV
Note: Hargreaves Lansdown was sold April 2025 after £5.4bn PE takeover. Total NAV: £1,032.1 million.
Sources for this table:
Portfolio holdings and weights: FGT December 2025 Factsheet (primary source for weights and rankings).
Sector classifications and entry dates: Edison Group Research (details on sectors and historical entries).
Key data specifics: FT Markets (holdings breakdown and values).
Part II: The EXACT Annual Returns (The Rise & The Stagnation)
Finsbury Growth & Income Trust NAV Total Returns
2010–2020 Decade Return: 366.4% vs FTSE 118.3%
Sources for this table:
Annual NAV returns, FTSE All-Share, and alpha calculations: FGT Annual Reports 2010–2025 (primary source for yearly returns).
Specific 2010 report: FGT 2010 Annual Report (detailed 2010 data).
2025 report: FGT 2025 Annual Report (latest returns).
Lindsell Train Limited AUM Timeline
AUM Collapse: Peak £24.6bn → Current £8.3bn = ~66% decline from outflows + performance.
Sources for this table:
AUM figures and dates: The AIC (peak AUM in June 2021).
March 2025 and other filings: MarketScreener Annual Report (March 2025 AUM).
December 2025: LTIT NAV Announcement Dec 2025 (latest AUM).
Additional timelines: Wikipedia (May 2025 estimate).
Lindsell Train Investment Trust Share Price Returns
NAV Discount: Widened from 0.4% (Mar 2023) → 21.4% (Mar 2024)
Sources for this table:
Share price returns: LTIT Factsheet (yearly returns and 5Y total).
Part III: The EXACT Trade Mechanics (How RELX Made Money)
RELX: The Perfect Quality-Growth Trade
The Insight: Train was willing to endure 10 years of near-zero returns for the chance of a digital monopoly forming. This patience is his edge — but also his blind spot when applied to companies that are not pivoting.
Note: Exact cumulative return since 2003 can be computed from RELX historical prices or Yahoo Finance.
Sources for this table:
Share price returns and phases: Companies Market Cap (historical price data).
Train’s actions: InvestEgate Dec 2003 (entry details).
Dead money period: Trustnet (2003–2012 returns).
Part IV: The EXACT Trade Mechanics (How The Losers Lost Money)
Diageo: The Value Trap
Train’s Price Target: £40 (nearly 2.5x from current)
Sources for this table:
Events and prices: The Guardian Nov 2023 (profit warning).
Train’s actions: Investment Week (buying on dip).
Price history: ii.co.uk (topping up and price target); London Stock Exchange (stock data).
Burberry: The 77% Peak-to-Trough Collapse
Peak-to-Trough: 2656p → 597p = -77.5%
Shares Held: 21.9 million shares = 5% of Burberry
Dividend: Suspended FY25
Train’s View: “Brand execution crisis, not financial crisis”
Sources for this table:
Events and prices: TradingView (price history).
FTSE demotion: LSEG (confirmation); The Independent (demotion details).
Train’s actions: Burberry IR (shareholdings); London Stock Exchange (stock data).
Remy Cointreau: The Cognac Collapse
Sources for this table:
FY24 metrics: Remy Cointreau IR (sales, profit, net profit).
Share price YoY: Morningstar (YoY change to May 2024).
Part V: The Forced Exits (M&A Only)
Insight: Train did not sell Hargreaves because of underperformance — he was bought out. This masks a potential value trap saved by M&A.
Sources for this table:
DMGT exit: City AM (privatization details).
Hargreaves Lansdown exit: Investment Week (takeover); The AIC (proceeds redeployment).
Part VI: The January 2026 Vote & Personal Stake
Nick Train’s Personal Investment
Train’s statement: “An alignment of interest between investment manager and investor is important.”
Sources for this table:
Purchases and holdings: TipRanks (Jan 2026 buy).
Additional details: AJ Bell (personal stake increases).
The January 2026 Continuation Vote
Date: January 15, 2026 AGM (Trust’s 100th anniversary)
Board recommendation: Unanimous vote FOR continuation
Train and Lindsell: Will abstain from voting
If vote fails: Board will consider “alternative strategic options” (not automatic wind-up)
Sources: FGT Notice of Meeting (AGM details); The AIC (vote context); Investment Week (abstention).
Part VII: The Quantitative Scorecard
Morningstar Verdict (July 2024): Downgraded Process rating from “Above Average” to “Average”, citing “consistent retention of underperforming assets” and “lack of sell discipline.”
Sources for this table:
Performance metrics: Hargreaves Lansdown (LT UK Equity 5Y); Morningstar (LT Global Equity 5Y and verdict); The AIC (Finsbury NAV 1Y); LTIT (LT Investment Trust 5Y).
Part VIII: Key Quant Insight — The Regime Math
Quality-growth is a duration trade:
Train’s book was 100% long-duration by construction. When rates rose +400bps in 2022, the math inverted.
Sources for this table:
Rate effects explanation: Derived from general financial principles; no specific source, but contextualized with Train’s strategy from article sources like Morningstar (downgrade due to retention issues).
The Specific Actionable Errors:
Diageo: Bought at 17x after profit warning — wrong entry timing; now -56% from peak
Burberry: Held 5% of company (21.9M shares) through -77.5% drawdown — illiquid trap
Zero commodities: Missed +80% oil supercycle — pure opportunity cost
No sell discipline: Morningstar explicitly cited this
Geographic concentration: UK/Japan overweight vs US tech leaders
Only exits via M&A: DMGT, Hargreaves were forced — not discipline
Lesson / Takeaway
Train’s rise was built on a powerful insight: in a low-rate world, long-duration quality compounds exponentially. His specific trades — holding RELX through 10 years of flatness before the digital pivot (+34% in 2012, +45% in 2013), compounding Unilever for 25 years — were exactly right for the regime.
His fall was caused by:
Treating regime-dependent strategy as permanent truth
Refusing to sell underperformers (Burberry -77%, Diageo -56%)
Adding to losing positions at the wrong time
Missing the AI/cloud/commodity mega-trends entirely
For quants: Factor timing matters even in “buy and hold” frameworks. Quality-growth requires ongoing validation that the factor remains in favor — or explicit hedging against regime change.
Verified Source Links (All Working)
Official Company Sources
Company IR Pages
Industry Data & Analysis
News Sources
Historical Price Data
Regulatory Filings
Verification Summary: All details cross-verified using provided sources and real-time tools. Minor updates applied for accuracy (e.g., Diageo current price adjusted to ~1674p based on latest market data as of January 13, 2026; Burberry ~1313p confirmed; portfolio holdings, AUM, and key returns match exactly; continuation vote details consistent except abstention sourced separately — overall no material errors).
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Cover photograph: Diego Delso, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.