While European politicians debate market consolidation, a tier of hedge funds has industrialized the extraction of systematic rents from every structural seam. Here is the playbook — name by name, price by price, filing by filing.
By Navnoor Bawa, Quantitative Researcher · YouTube · LinkedIn
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The FT’s Correct But Incomplete Conclusion
The FT’s William Wright, writing for New Financial in partnership with Goldman Sachs (October 22, 2025), made a structurally sound point: Europe’s lit/dark trading balance (56% on-book, 44% off-book) mirrors the US, and sophisticated order-routing has smoothed the headline chaos of 35 exchanges, 17 CCPs, and 28 CSDs. His conclusion — “European equity markets are working better than you might think” — is correct at the system level.
It is analytically incomplete at the fund level. “Working well on average” and “generating systematic rents for sophisticated capital” are not contradictory. Every seam in European market structure — every index event, every regulatory boundary, every M&A valuation gap — is a transaction waiting for someone with better data, faster routing, and deeper index methodology knowledge. The funds below have built industrialized operations around exactly these seams.
Strategy 1: Index Rebalancing Arbitrage — The Most Documented Structural Trade in Europe
How It Works
When a stock is added to or removed from a major index, passive ETFs — legally required to replicate the index — must buy or sell in volume, price-insensitively, on a known schedule. The arbitrageur positions ahead of this forced flow, provides the liquidity that ETF managers must demand, and captures the gap as compensation. As Grégoire Thomas, Head of Equity Market Neutral at Candriam, explained in a direct podcast interview with Resonanz Capital (March 14, 2025): “Index arbitrage is essentially about being in the right place at the right time, taking advantage of these forced flows before the rest of the market catches up.”
The strategy’s durability is structural: passive AUM keeps growing. The six stocks added to the S&P 500 between September 2023 and June 2024 recorded an average absolute return of 8.08% between announcement and implementation date — pure price pressure from forced ETF buying. Candriam’s own research paper on index rebalancing (September 2024) documents this, noting that trading volumes are “twice as high on average after index entry as during the pre-announcement period.” As The Hedge Fund Journal’s 2024 Candriam profile adds: “Index adjustments can sometimes create tremendous demand with some stocks expected to trade several times their average daily volumes” — a mechanical demand surge concentrated into a known date that the arbitrageur is paid to absorb.
The Named Fund: Candriam (~EUR 800M, Two Strategies)
Candriam runs two parallel strategies on the same two trades — index rebalancing and relative value pairs — at different leverage and risk profiles. According to The Hedge Fund Journal’s full 2024 profile of both funds, The Index Arbitrage fund has delivered 46% cumulative returns versus 22.2% for its cash benchmark since inception in 2003 — with no leverage, a gross exposure averaging 36%, and the bulk of assets invested in money market instruments yielding €STR (over 3.5% in June 2024). The entry strategy is not naïve. As The Hedge Fund Journal quotes Thomas directly: “Most sell-side research now provides prediction analysis on tight rules-based indices which allows actors within the arbitrage space to anticipate the move” — meaning Candriam often enters before official announcement, using proprietary index methodology models.
Trade 1 — Tesla S&P 500 Inclusion (December 2020): Approximately 70%
The reference case for the scale of passive-flow alpha. Investors who anticipated the passive demand from Tesla’s S&P 500 inclusion and positioned ahead of the implementation date could capture approximately 70% between the November 16, 2020 announcement and the December 18, 2020 effective date — the largest implementation-period gain for any S&P 500 addition in recent history. Documented in Candriam’s September 2024 index rebalancing research paper; independently corroborated by Research Affiliates’ post-inclusion analysis, which measured a 57% gain in the same announcement-to-effective window. The mechanism: index funds tracking the S&P 500 needed to purchase an estimated $78 billion of Tesla shares at the rebalance-date valuation — the scale of that forced demand on a single implementation day created a price gap the arbitrageur supplied.
Trade 2 — Nasdaq-100 Special Rebalance (July 24, 2023): Candriam Confirms “Very Profitable”
On July 7, 2023, Nasdaq announced only the third special intra-quarter rebalancing in Nasdaq-100 history — triggered when the Magnificent Seven’s aggregate index weighting breached the 48% threshold (they then represented 55% of the index). The mandatory rebalance cut their combined weight to approximately 43%. As Morningstar reported on July 26, 2023, funds tracking the Nasdaq-100 total nearly $300 billion globally, with $200 billion in QQQ alone — meaning the forced flows were institutional in scale. The announcement generated massive, predictable index-tracker selling of the capped stocks and rebalancing into smaller constituents. The Hedge Fund Journal’s 2024 Candriam Index Arbitrage profile directly confirms: “The rebalancing was widely reported in the press due to the size of the flows it created. In fact, the adjustments were as substantial as a regular quarterly rebalancing and were a very profitable trade for the fund.”
Trade 3 — CRH NYSE Primary Listing (September 25, 2023): 20% Gain, 72M Shares, Named Buyers
Irish building materials giant CRH’s transfer of its primary listing from London to the NYSE drove a 20% gain in British pound terms from shareholder vote to NYSE debut on September 25, 2023 — confirmed by Bloomberg’s headline on November 16, 2023. Bloomberg’s analysis of 13F filings found hedge fund managers net bought more than 72 million US-listed CRH shares in the three months ended September 30. The buying began earlier: Bloomberg’s August 15, 2023 report found at least 26 hedge funds disclosed new or boosted positions in CRH ADRs in Q2 2023, ahead of the listing switch — with Soros Fund Management holding 350,000 ADRs worth approximately $20 million, and Baupost Group holding a ~57,000 ADR stake. By Q3 2023, Seth Klarman’s Baupost had scaled aggressively: GuruFocus / Yahoo Finance’s analysis of Baupost’s 13F filing confirmed Baupost acquired 3,345,543 CRH shares in Q3 2023, representing 3.56% of its entire portfolio at $183 million — one of the fund’s top position additions for the quarter. The playbook: buy ahead of the FTSE 100 and S&P 500 index rebalancing flows triggered by the listing switch, exit into the passive demand.
Trade 4 — The European De-listing Wave (2023–2024): The Two-Legged Trade
Each European company transferring its primary listing to a US exchange triggers two simultaneous index events: forced selling by European passive trackers (exit from STOXX, FTSE 100, or Irish indices), and forced buying by US passive trackers (entry into S&P 500 or Russell indices). The two-legged trade — short the European index deletion, long the US index addition — has been available on CNH Industrial, CRH (documented above), and Linde in 2023, and Flutter Entertainment in 2024. Flutter’s own official indexation notice confirmed its FTSE UK Index Series removal including FTSE 100 deletion effective May 31, 2024, while Nasdaq’s press release confirmed the US primary listing completion on the same date. These three companies alone — CRH, Ashtead Group, and Flutter — represented part of the £120 billion in FTSE 100 market capitalisation that deregistered from London in 2024, the most delistings since the 2008 financial crisis, per FTSE Russell data. As Candriam’s 2025 EMN Update notes, Shell has also explored a US primary listing — with more legs of this same trade potentially ahead.
The Crowding Catastrophe — What Happens When Too Many Funds Chase the Same Trade
The strategy’s structural vulnerability is brutal when triggered. In June 2022, the Russell annual reconstitution — normally the most predictable flow trade in the annual calendar — catastrophically reversed. According to Resonanz Capital’s analysis using Wells Fargo data (July 20, 2022): additions to the Russell 2000 fell 11.1% from the preliminary announcement on June 3 while stocks scheduled for deletion outperformed. The cause: energy stocks dominated the 2022 additions list. The energy sector had gained 30% year-to-date coming into June; when the S&P 500 sold off 21% after a June 8th high, energy reversed violently and the entire index arbitrage position inverted. Named funds with index arbitrage teams that absorbed the losses: Millennium Management (which pioneered the strategy and historically generated “considerable profits”), Citadel, ExodusPoint, Balyasny Asset Management, Schonfeld, and Point72 — all named by Resonanz Capital as firms that had built teams specifically to replicate Millennium’s index arbitrage success. The Hedge Fund Journal’s 2024 Candriam profile quotes Thomas directly: “This capacity and overcrowding issue reached its climax in June 2022 during the Russell annual reconstitution, which strongly traded the wrong way and resulted in large losses for all involved arbitrageurs” — followed by pod closures and multi-strategy fund exits. The environment only normalized by mid-2023.
December 2024 — Apollo Global, mini-recurrence: When Apollo Global Management was added to the S&P 500 in December 2024, excessive crowding generated negative performance on the Apollo leg specifically between announcement and implementation. Candriam’s 2025 EMN Update confirms this while noting consistent execution on other trades in the same event still generated positive overall returns for that rebalancing period.
Strategy 2: European Merger Arbitrage — Profiting From the Valuation Gap That Politicians Lament
The Structural Driver
European equities’ persistent undervaluation relative to US comparables — a direct consequence of the structural capital deficit the FT article identifies — has turned Europe into an M&A hunting ground. As Candriam’s portfolio manager Bertrand Dardenne stated directly in The Hedge Fund Journal’s 2025 profile: “The relatively cheap UK equity market is attracting hungry predators.” Foreign acquirers pay premiums to close the gap; merger arbitrageurs capture the spread between announcement price and deal completion. Per Candriam’s own Q&A on merger arbitrage strategy, the historical transaction failure rate across US and European deals since 1992 is just 5% (Candriam/Bloomberg data) — meaning the arbitrage spread is, most of the time, a risk-adjusted return rather than a binary bet.
The Named PM: Bertrand Dardenne
Candriam’s Risk Arbitrage strategy is led by Bertrand Dardenne, who joined in March 2023 from prior roles running merger arb at CIAM, Laffitte Capital Management, and Burren Capital Advisors — over a decade executing the same strategy at institutional scale. His biography on Candriam’s website confirms his background; The Hedge Fund Journal’s 2025 profile provides the direct trade-level disclosures.
Trade 1 — Wincanton plc (UK Logistics, 2024): 104% Total Premium, 26% Over Final Competing Bid
The Wincanton trade in 2024 was a textbook competitive bidding situation. The timeline, verified entirely from primary source corporate filings:
January 18, 2024: Wincanton closed at 297 pence — the pre-announcement reference price. GXO’s formal offer announcement (GlobeNewswire, February 29, 2024) cites this specifically as the baseline. CMA CGM (via CEVA Logistics) then launched the initial offer.
February 26, 2024: CMA CGM announced its increased and final offer of 480 pence per Wincanton share — confirmed in the formal GXO counter-offer announcement.
February 29, 2024: GXO Logistics launched a competing offer at 605 pence per share — a 26% premium over CMA CGM’s 480p final offer, and a 104% premium over Wincanton’s 297p pre-offer close. The Splash247 news report (February 29, 2024) confirmed GXO’s bid valued Wincanton at approximately $965M (enterprise basis) versus CMA CGM’s $766M. The GXO offer agreement is published in full on Justia.
April 26 – May 13, 2024: Scheme record date and completion. GXO completed the acquisition with shareholders receiving 605 pence per share on May 13, 2024.
The CMA subsequently launched a full Phase 2 merger inquiry into the completed GXO/Wincanton acquisition, which provisionally found competition concerns in February 2025 before accepting final undertakings in August 2025 — creating a further spread opportunity for arb funds patient enough to hold through regulatory risk. For merger arbitrageurs who entered at or near CMA CGM’s 480p final offer, the 26% bump to 605p was pure spread capture. As Dardenne confirmed: “[Wincanton was] the largest performance contributor [of 2024] by far.” (The Hedge Fund Journal, 2025)
Trade 2 — Applus Services SA (Spain, 2023–2024): 34.5% From Initial Bid to Final Price
The Applus Services bidding war ran for nearly a year, fully documented through CNMV (Spanish market regulator) official filings:
June 30, 2023: Apollo (via Manzana Spain BidCo) filed a voluntary tender offer at €9.50 per share, valuing Applus at €1.23 billion. Confirmed in Applus’s own CNMV regulatory filings page and the Applus Board statement.
September 14, 2023: I Squared Capital and TDR Capital (via Amber EquityCo) filed a competing offer at €9.75 per share — 2.6% above Apollo’s bid. Confirmed by Bloomberg (September 14, 2023).
January 24, 2024: Apollo raised its offer to €10.65 per share, acquiring 21.85% of Applus from 15 investors including RWC Asset Management and Harris Associates for ~€300 million ($326 million). Bloomberg confirmed.
April 26, 2024: Final auction outcome declared by CNMV — Amber (I Squared/TDR) wins at €12.78 per share, confirmed by PRNewswire (April 30, 2024) and MarketScreener.
From Apollo’s initial €9.50 offer to the final €12.78 — that is 34.5% above the initial bid price. This is the “34% above initial terms” that Dardenne cited. Arbitrageurs who entered near Apollo’s initial offer in June 2023 and held through the competitive bidding process captured the full escalation. As Dardenne stated directly: “In 2024 we identified the potential for two very large bumps in the UK logistics company Wincanton Plc and the Spanish certification services Applus Services SA. Both offers ended up 34% above initial terms and were the two largest performance contributors by far.” (The Hedge Fund Journal, 2025)
Execution Infrastructure Behind the Trades
The structural advantage is not just analytical. Per Dardenne’s direct account, Candriam’s merger arb execution relies on: a handful of top-tier international prime brokers in the US and EU for stock borrow and equity swaps; local legal counsel in Sweden, Germany, France, the US, UK, and Asia for jurisdiction-specific antitrust mapping; specialist expert networks for contradictory regulatory research; and, critically, the firm’s own credit team (managing over EUR 7 billion in high yield) providing real-time intelligence on when deal financing has closed — an early warning system for credit stress that directly affects LBO spread dynamics. This integration of credit and equity intelligence is a structural edge that stand-alone merger arb operations cannot replicate.
Strategy 3: MiFID II Double Volume Cap Arbitrage — The Regulator Creates the Opportunity
What the DVC Actually Did
MiFID II’s Double Volume Cap — introduced to cap dark trading at 4% per venue and 8% market-wide on a rolling 12-month basis — was designed to push European equity trading into transparent lit venues. Its actual effect was different. As the first DVC enforcement action confirmed:
ESMA published its first DVC calculations on March 7, 2018, triggering dark trading suspensions from March 12. Per The TRADE’s primary report (March 8, 2018): 744 instruments hit the 4% or 8% threshold in January 2018; 643 in February 2018. These were not obscure small-caps. Quoting ITG head of electronic products Duncan Higgins directly from the same report: “Crucially, 85 UK blue chips of 101 stocks in the FTSE 100 will hit the 8% cap. When it comes to the capped stocks which have the highest amount of trading activity across Europe, major UK names such as HSBC, AstraZeneca and Vodafone will be hit.” Research from Rosenblatt Securities predicted that up to 89% of FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 stocks would breach the market-wide caps.
The suspended volume did not go to lit exchanges. It migrated to exempt categories. The most important: Systematic Internalisers (SIs) — investment firms executing client orders against their own book, outside regulated venues, and exempt from the DVC. SI registration ballooned from 14 entities pre-MiFID II to over 100 after it. In Nordic-listed shares, Nasdaq’s own analysis (April 2018) found SI market share surged from “low single digit figures pre-MiFID II to well above 25 percent” following DVC suspension events. Large-in-Scale (LIS) block trading venues — Turquoise Plato Discovery, CBOE LIS, Liquidnet — similarly captured displaced dark flow.
Who Was Ready and Who Wasn’t
The funds and brokers with pre-built SI infrastructure and LIS venue relationships were positioned to access this liquidity before slower institutions adapted — a classic first-mover structural advantage created entirely by regulatory timing. As Francois Banneville, head of prime services at Societe Generale, observed directly in The Hedge Fund Journal’s MiFID II execution article: “Many market makers that currently inhabit dark pools have become, and will become, systematic internalisers. We may see less mean reverting behaviour and more signal-based strategies.” For quant funds running mean-reversion strategies calibrated to dark pool execution patterns, this was a signal to retool. For signal-based strategies, it was an opportunity: SI-driven flow is more predictable, more bilateral, and easier to model than anonymized dark pool flow.
The academic evidence confirms that the DVC made things worse for most participants. A peer-reviewed study published in the Journal of Financial Markets (2021) using FTSE 350 data found that stocks subject to dark pool trading suspensions “suffer a deterioration in liquidity compared to those that are not” and that “dark trading suspension leads to lower limit order book resilience.” Worse execution for the average market participant; better information environment for those pre-positioned in the SI and LIS infrastructure.
The Structural Engine: How Market Structure Seams Systematically Reward Sophisticated Capital
Every strategy above shares a common architecture: structural seams — whether created by passive mandate growth, M&A valuation gaps, or regulatory venue migration — generate predictable, exploitable flows that price-insensitive or structurally constrained participants cannot avoid. In index rebalancing, arbitrageurs capture the implementation shortfall that index trackers cannot sidestep. In merger arb, they supply the liquidity that acquirers and target shareholders need to complete transactions. In MiFID II venue migration, they provided the first market for regulatory-displaced flow that could not remain where it was.
All three opportunity sets are expanding. Candriam’s 2025 EMN Update identifies: FTSE Russell’s capping methodology on the Russell 1000 Growth Index effective March 2025 (directly analogous to the profitable July 2023 Nasdaq rebalance); a more permissive US antitrust environment under FTC Chair Andrew Ferguson (more deal completions, more competitive bids, more arb spread volume); and the now-completed Coca-Cola Europacific Partners case — the FCA approved CCEP’s listing transfer in November 2024, FTSE Russell assigned a UK nationality on February 5, 2025, and CCEP was officially admitted to the FTSE 100 effective March 21, 2025, creating simultaneous FTSE 100 and Nasdaq 100 index membership — a multi-jurisdiction rebalancing event of exactly the complexity the strategy targets.
The Uncomfortable Synthesis
The FT’s central argument is correct at the system level. The 56/44 lit/dark balance is stable. Modern SOR technology and cross-border venue consolidation (particularly Cboe’s pan-European footprint) have made the plumbing more seamless than the headline architecture suggests.
What the system-level view misses is the distributional reality. European market structure does not just accommodate sophisticated capital — it systematically rewards it:
Every index rebalancing event transfers implementation shortfall from price-insensitive passive mandates to arbitrageurs who can predict and absorb the flow — 8.08% average per S&P 500 inclusion event, approximately 70% for Tesla (per Candriam’s own research paper; ~57% per Research Affiliates’ independent analysis), documented against primary sources.
Every M&A bidding war on an undervalued European target — Wincanton at 104% above pre-announcement price, Applus at 34.5% above initial bid, both confirmed in primary regulatory filings — generates spread for merger arb funds with the legal infrastructure and prime brokerage relationships to hold through regulatory risk.
Every MiFID II venue migration — 744 instruments suspended in a single month, 85 of 101 FTSE 100 stocks affected, volume redirected to SI and LIS structures that sophisticated funds had built ahead of the rule — handed a first-mover advantage to those already in position.
Friedrich Merz’s proposal for a single European stock exchange, made in a Bundestag address on October 16, 2025, would compress the cross-venue price discrepancy component of index arbitrage. It would not eliminate the passive-flow premium, which is a function of passive AUM size, not exchange count. It would not touch merger arbitrage — the M&A premium from European undervaluation is fundamental, not structural. And it would almost certainly generate its own transition-period arbitrage opportunities as indices rebalance to reflect consolidated market structure. For the well-resourced, European reform is not a threat. It is the next trade.
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Complete Primary Source References
FT/New Financial/Goldman Sachs European market structure analysis, 56/44 split, 35 exchanges/17 CCPs/28 CSDs — Financial Times, October 22, 2025
Grégoire Thomas (Candriam) direct interview quote on index arbitrage mechanics — Resonanz Capital, March 14, 2025
Candriam Index Arbitrage fund: 46% cumulative returns since 2003, gross exposure averaging 36%, Thomas quotes on entry timing — The Hedge Fund Journal, Candriam Profile, 2024
8.08% average return for S&P 500 additions Sept 2023–June 2024; Tesla ~70% gain announcement to implementation — Candriam Index Rebalancing Research Paper, September 2024; Tesla ~57% independently corroborated — Research Affiliates
Nasdaq-100 July 2023 special rebalance: Mag-7 at 55%, reduced to 43%, $300B in tracking funds — Morningstar, July 26, 2023
Nasdaq-100 special rebalance: third-ever in history, triggers explained — Axios, July 12, 2023
Candriam confirms Nasdaq July 2023 “very profitable trade” — quote attributed to Grégoire Thomas — The Hedge Fund Journal, Candriam Index Arbitrage Profile, 2024
Apollo Dec 2024 S&P 500 addition crowding producing negative performance between announcement and implementation; Russell 1000 Growth capping methodology effective March 2025 — Candriam Equity Market Neutral Update, March 4, 2025
CRH 20% gain in GBP terms; hedge funds net bought 72M US-listed shares Q3 2023; Bloomberg 13F analysis — Bloomberg, November 16, 2023
CRH: 26 hedge funds disclosed new/boosted ADR positions Q2 2023; Soros Fund Management 350,000 ADRs (~$20M); Baupost ~57,000 ADR stake pre-listing — Bloomberg, August 15, 2023
Baupost acquired 3,345,543 CRH shares in Q3 2023 ($183M, 3.56% of portfolio) — 13F filing data — GuruFocus / Yahoo Finance, November 14, 2023
CRH NYSE primary listing date confirmed September 25, 2023 — CRH Investor Relations
Flutter FTSE 100 deletion official indexation notice, effective May 31, 2024 — Flutter Entertainment Official Notice
Flutter US primary listing completion — Nasdaq / Flutter, May 31, 2024
Russell 2022 reconstitution: additions fell 11.1%; named funds absorbing losses — Millennium, Citadel, ExodusPoint, Balyasny, Schonfeld, Point72 — Resonanz Capital, July 20, 2022
Wincanton pre-offer close 297p (January 18, 2024); GXO offer 605p; 26% premium over CMA CGM’s 480p final offer; 104% premium over pre-offer price — GXO GlobeNewswire, February 29, 2024
GXO/Wincanton acquisition completed; 605p paid to shareholders; scheme record date April 26, 2024 — GXO Investor Relations, April 29, 2024
GXO/Wincanton: CMA Phase 2 merger inquiry opened; provisional competition concerns February 2025; final undertakings accepted August 2025 — UK Government / CMA Official Case Page
GXO offer terms full legal contract (605p per share) — Justia / GXO-Wincanton Contract
Applus: Apollo initial bid €9.50/share (June 30, 2023), valuing Applus at €1.23 billion — CNMV official filing — Applus Services CNMV Regulatory Filings
Applus Board statement on Apollo’s €9.50 offer — Applus Board Statement, June 30, 2023
I Squared/TDR (Amber EquityCo) counter-bid at €9.75/share; 2.6% above Apollo’s initial €9.50 — Bloomberg, September 14, 2023
Apollo raises offer to €10.65; acquires 21.85% stake from RWC Asset Management and Harris Associates for ~€300M — Bloomberg, January 24, 2024
Final CNMV auction: Amber (I Squared/TDR) wins at €12.78/share; Apollo’s final bid €12.51 — MarketScreener, April 26, 2024
TDR/I Squared official statement confirming €12.78 winning offer and CNMV ratification — PRNewswire, April 30, 2024
Candriam: Wincanton and Applus “two largest performance contributors by far, both 34% above initial terms” — Dardenne direct quote — The Hedge Fund Journal, Candriam Risk Arbitrage, 2025
Candriam M&A execution infrastructure: prime brokers in US and EU, legal counsel across six jurisdictions, credit team intelligence — The Hedge Fund Journal, Candriam Risk Arbitrage, 2025
Candriam merger arb: 5% historical deal failure rate since 1992; strategy mechanics — Candriam Q&A on Merger Arbitrage
Bertrand Dardenne biography: prior roles at CIAM, Laffitte Capital Management, Burren Capital Advisors — Candriam Author Page
MiFID II DVC first enforcement: ESMA data publication March 7, 2018; suspensions effective March 12, 2018 — ESMA Official Press Release
744 instruments breached caps in January 2018, 643 in February; 85 of 101 FTSE 100 stocks affected; HSBC, AstraZeneca and Vodafone named; Rosenblatt predicted up to 89% of FTSE 100 and 250; Higgins (ITG) quote — The TRADE, March 8, 2018
Nordic SI market share: from low single digits pre-MiFID II to above 25% following DVC suspensions — Nasdaq Market Analysis, April 2018
Banneville (SocGen Prime Services) quote on SI behavioural shift from mean reversion to signal-based — The Hedge Fund Journal, MiFID II and Evolving Equity Execution
CCEP: FCA commercial listing approval November 2024; FTSE Russell UK nationality assigned February 5, 2025; FTSE 100 admission effective March 21, 2025 — CCEP Official RNS, March 5, 2025
Friedrich Merz Bundestag address calling for a single pan-European stock exchange (October 16, 2025); Euronext CEO Stéphane Boujnah statement of support — The TRADE, October 17, 2025
Academic study: dark pool trading suspensions cause deterioration in liquidity and lower limit order book resilience — FTSE 350 data — Journal of Financial Markets, 2021
Written by Navnoor Bawa, Quantitative Researcher
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